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THE PITFALLS OF WILL CONTEST
LITIGATION
PETER I. MASON*
& MARK W. WEISBARD**
INTRODUCTION

Even the most experienced trial lawyers rarely have the opportunity to try a will contest to a jury. This is due, in part, to
the relatively small number of such cases. In addition, the uncertainty of result, combined with the "all-or-nothing" aspect of
the verdict,' tends to result in a larger percentage of settlements
in will contests than in other areas of litigation. Thus, many
practitioners may be unaware that, because of the peculiar nature of these cases, the application of certain general rules of
evidence often gives rise to unusual and unexpected results.
Evidentiary rules have also developed specifically in the will
contest area which do not usually appear in other types of
litigation.
Two rules of evidence are particularly troublesome when
applied in will contests. The general prohibition in Illinois that
prevents a witness from giving opinion testimony, especially as
to the "ultimate fact" in a jury case, 2 can seriously interfere with
either the proponent's or contestant's efforts to show the competence or incompetence of the testator. Even more significant is
the operation of the Illinois "Dead Man's" Act, 3 which often has
the effect of rendering all the parties to the action incompetent
4
to testify.
* Partner in the firm of Freeborn &Peters, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1976; B.A., Bard College, New York, 1973.
** Associate in the firm of Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar and Poust, Chicago,
Illinois; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1979; B.A. Dartmouth,
College 1976.
The authors wish to thank Mr. Thomas S. Reif, Northwestern University School of Law, Class of 1983, for his assistance in preparing this article.
1. Because a will contested on grounds of undue influence or lack of
testamentary capacity is found either valid or invalid in toto, there is no
possibility that the litigation can benefit both parties.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 8-30.
3. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-201 (Smith-Hurd 1983) [hereinafter referred to as the Dead Man's Act). Courts have also referred to this provision as section 2, since it was originally codified as § 2 of the Evidence Act.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1982 Supp.).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 32-54.
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Two other evidentiary rules, unique to will contests, also
may have important effects on the outcome of the litigation. To
control juries and protect the validity of wills, Illinois courts
have developed a rule excluding most evidence of "declarations"
by a testator which tend to contradict the terms of the will.5 Secondly, a presumption of undue influence 6 may arise in the case
of certain fiduciaries which can greatly aid the contestant's
case. 7 This article will analyze these evidentiary issues under
Illinois law, discuss some recent trends, and make recommendations for practitioners involved in will litigation, concluding with
the suggestion that will contests be tried without a jury.
OPINION TESTIMONY IN WILL CONTESTS
It is generally recognized that nonexpert witnesses may testify only to facts within their personal knowledge and may not
give opinion testimony. 8 The reason for this rule is the concern
that juries will rely upon witnesses' opinions in deciding cases
without considering whether the opinions have adequate factual
foundation. An exception to this rule has evolved where the witness' conclusions are needed to aid the jury's ability to under9
stand and put the factual testimony in perspective.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 55-75.
6. See ILL. PATTERN JURy INSTR. 200.03 and comment (Civil, 2nd ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as IPI 200.03]. See also infra text accompanying
notes 78-94.
7. The effect of this presumption may have been emasculated, however, by a recent Illinois Supreme Court case restricting the application of
presumptions in jury trials. See Diederich v. Walters, 65 I1. 2d 95, 357 N.E.2d
1128 (1976).
8. Yarber v. Chicago &Alton Ry., 235 Ill. 589, 85 N.E. 928 (1908):
Opinion evidence is admissible only upon subjects not within the
knowledge of men of ordinary experience, and upon the ground that the
facts are of such a nature that they can not be presented in such a manner that jurors of ordinary intelligence and experience in the affairs of
life can appreciate them in their relations and comprehend them sufficiently to form accurate opinions and draw correct inferences from
them on which to base intelligent judgments. The opinions of witnesses should not be received as evidence where all the facts on which
such opinions are founded can be ascertained and made intelligible to
the jury.
Id. at 593-94, 85 N.E. at 930. See also Springfield &N.E. Traction Co. v. Warrick, 249 Ill. 470, 478-79, 94 N.E. 933, 937 (1911); Gerler v. Cooley, 41 Ill. App. 2d
233, 190 N.E.2d 488 (1963).
9. In Barnes v. Odum, 304 Ill. 624, 136 N.E. 700 (1922), the Illinois
Supreme Court set forth the reason why opinions of nonexpert witnesses
on the subject of a person's sanity are admissible:
While the mere opinion of a non-professional witness predicated upon
facts detailed by others is incompetent as evidence upon an issue of
insanity, his judgment based upon personal knowledge of the circumstances involved in such an inquiry certainly is of value, because the
natural and ordinary operations of the human intellect, and the appear-
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Specifically, courts allow nonexpert witnesses to express opinions which lay persons usually form upon observing a certain
set of facts. 10 For example, nonexpert witnesses may testify
that a person appeared to be intoxicated." This exception is
limited, however, to opinions which do not involve the "ultimate
12
fact" in a case.
ance and conduct of insane persons as contrasted with the appearance
and conduct of persons of sound mind, are more or less understood and
recognized by everyone of ordinary intelligence who comes in contact
with his species.... The truth is, the statement of a non-professional
witness as to the sanity or insanity, at a particular time, of an individual
whose appearance, manner, habits and conduct came under his personal observation is not the expression of mere opinion.... But in a
substantial sense, and for every purpose essential to a safe conclusion,

the mental condition of an individual, as sane or insane, is a fact, and

the expressed opinion of one who has had adequate opportunities to
observe his conduct and appearance is but the statement of a fact....
Id. at 627-28, 136 N.E. at 702 (quoting Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. v. Lath-

rop, 111 U.S. 612, 619 (1884)).

10. See, e.g., West Chicago St. Ry. v. Fishman, 169 I1. 196, 48 N.E. 447

(1897) (health of an accident victim); Estate of McCullough v. McTavish, 62

Ill. App. 3d 1041, 379 N.E.2d 890 (1978) (intoxication); Jackson v. Jackson, 24
Ill. App. 3d 810, 321 N.E.2d 506 (1974) (spouse's mental health in a divorce
case in which mental capacity was at issue).
The general rule against opinion testimony and the exceptions thereto
as developed in the Illinois courts are mirrored in Rule 701 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
FED.

R. EviD. 701.

11. City of Aurora v. Hillman, 90111. 61, 63 (1878); Dimick v. Downs, 82 Inl.
570 (1876); Estate of McCullough v. McTavish, 62 IM. App. 3d 1041, 1044, 379
N.E.2d 890, 893 (1978); Nystrom v. Bub, 36 Ill.
App. 2d 333, 347, 184 N.E.2d 273,
279 (1962).
12. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. First City Corp., 58 Ill. App. 3d 575, 577-78, 374
N.E.2d 913, 915 (1978) (appellate court refused to allow lessee's agent to testify, in action for forcible detainer, that the premises were unlivable; that
being the ultimate fact in the case). See also Morton Grove v. Gelchsheimer, 16 Ill. 2d 453, 458, 158 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1959) (in proceeding for special
assessment, exhibit containing value of each improvement held inadmissible because it contained conclusions of ultimate fact); Armstrong Paint &
Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 308 Ill. 242, 245, 139 N.E. 395, 396
(1923) ('"There are cases where a witness may state what is in the nature of
a conclusion as to a material evidentiary fact based upon other facts within
his knowledge; ... but such testimony is not admissible where it is a conclusion of the witness as to the ultimate fact in issue to be determined by
the jury, leaving nothing for the jury except to render a verdict according to
the conclusion of the witness as to such ultimate fact.") (citations omitted).
As to opinion evidence on the ultimate issue in will contests, see infra notes
21-25, 28 and accompanying text.
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Mental Capacity
Of particular interest in will contests is opinion testimony
by nonexperts on the issue of the testator's sanity. The Illinois
Supreme Court has long held that such testimony is admissible. 1 3 These witnesses play a crucial role when the testamentary capacity of the testator is under attack. Both proponents
and contestants are eager to offer the opinions of relatives,
neighbors, and acquaintances of the testator regarding his sanity at the time the will was executed.
To minimize the potentially prejudicial use of such opinion
testimony, three limitations on admissibility and scope have
been devised. First, a substantial foundation must be laid to
show that the witness has sufficient knowledge of the facts to
express an opinion. 14 Second, the opinion must reasonably tend
13. Opinion testimony on the issue of a person's mental condition has
long been one of the exceptions to the rule against the admission of lay
witnesses' opinions. Craig v. Southard, 148 Ill. 37, 35 N.E. 361 (1893) (contestants should have been allowed to ask lay witnesses to describe the condition of the testator's mind during the last few years of his life). See also
Ergang v. Anderson, 378 Ill. 312, 315-16, 38 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1941); Speirer v.
Curtis, 312 Ill. 152, 143 N.E. 427 (1924); Keithley v. Stafford, 126 Ill. 507, 18
N.E. 740 (1888). Cf. Bowman v. Illinois Central R.R., 11 111. 2d 186, 212, 142
N.E.2d 104, 120, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957).
14. Speirer v. Curtis, 312 Ill. 152, 159, 143 N.E. 427, 430 (1924). The foundation requirement has been described as follows:
[Al person who is not an expert may give his opinion concerning the
mental capacity of a testator if it appears that such witness has an acquaintance with the person whose competency is in question, and relates facts and circumstances which afford reasonable ground for
determining the soundness or unsoundness of mind of such
person....
Ergang v. Anderson, 378 Ill. 312, 315-16, 38 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1941). See also
Quellmalz v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 Ill. 2d 546, 158 N.E.2d 591 (1959); Innis v.
Mueller, 403 Ill. 11, 84 N.E.2d 837 (1949); Jackman v. North, 398 IIl. 90, 75
N.E.2d 324 (1947); Challiner v. Smith, 396 Ill. 106, 71 N.E.2d 324 (1947); Lewis
v. Deamude, 376 Ml1. 219, 33 N.E.2d 440 (1941); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 361 Ill.
499, 198 N.E. 432 (1935). As an exception to this rule, attesting or subscribing witnesses may testify as to the mental capacity of a testator at the time
of the execution of the will without the attorney first laying a foundation.
See Brownlie v. Brownlie, 357 Ill. 117, 123, 191 N.E. 268, 271 (1934).
In Baddeley v. Watkins, 293 Ill. 394,127 N.E. 725 (1920), a witness whose

only contact with the testator was an hour-long conversation three months
following execution was held incompetent to express an opinion on the testator's mental condition. Accord Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 288
N.E.2d 82 (1972). It should be noted that, even where a witness knew the
testator all of his life, he may not be able to testify as to the testator's
mental condition near the time of the will's execution if the witness' contact

with the testator at that time was minimal. Peters v. Catt, 15 Ill. 2d 255, 154
N.E.2d 280 (1958). Cf. McGovern v. McGovern, 282 Ill. 97, 118 N.E. 454 (1918)

(witness allowed to express opinion based upon his years of acquaintance
and one incident of strange behavior by testator); Wetzel v. Firebaugh, 251
Ill. 190, 95 N.E. 1085 (1911) (witness allowed to testify where she had only
conversed with testator on mundane subjects such as weather, health, gardens, etc.).
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to show the testator's mental condition on the date of the execution of the will. i s Third, the witness cannot give an opinion on
the ultimate issue in the case; i.e., whether the testator had the
legal capacity to execute his last will. 16 While a witness may testify as to the sanity of a testator without having seen him on the
day the will was executed, the witness may not express an opinion regarding the condition of the testator on dates he or she had
not seen the testator.17 These limitations reflect the court's dis-

trust of a jury's ability to evaluate opinion testimony.
Within the parameters of this rule, courts are more receptive to opinions concerning the testator's mental condition
before, rather than after, the will's execution. Some court decisions have indicated that opinions as to the testator's condition
up to two years before the execution of a will are not too remote.' 8 Where a testator suffered from a physical or mental condition of a continuous nature, such as a stroke or senility, before
the execution of the will, such condition is presumed to have
existed at the time of execution. 19 In contrast, an opinion regarding a testator's sanity based upon a physical or mental condition existing after the will's execution will not be admitted
unless it is proved that the same condition existed when the will
15. Milne v. McFadden, 385 Ill. 11, 52 N.E.2d 146 (1943); Knudson v.
Knudson, 382 M. 492,46 N.E.2d 1011 (1943). See also Wright v. Upson, 303 I.
120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922) (opinions that testatrix was of unsound mind on
certain date not admissible where it was not claimed and there was no evidence that testator lacked mental capacity on that date). Accord In re Estate of Milligan, 4 111. App. 3d 38, 280 N.E.2d 244 (1972). But see Maher v.
Maher, 338 Ill. 102, 170 N.E. 221 (1930) (court allowed evidence-not opinions--of mental soundness six years prior to execution of will). Flanigon v.
Smith, 337 Ill. 572, 169 N.E. 767 (1929) (witness who testified that testator
engaged ably in business transactions held incompetent to testify that testator was mentally incompetent); Innis v. Mueller, 403 III. 11, 84 N.E.2d 837
(1949).

16. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
17. Baddeley v. Watkins, 293 I1.394, 127 N.E. 725 (1920); Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972).
18. Trustees of Voodry v. University of Illinois, 251 M. 48, 95 N.E. 1034
(1911). See also Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 IIM. 2d 160, 115 N.E.2d 226 (1953)

(two days prior to will); Maher v. Maher, 338 Ill. 102, 170 N.E. 221 (1930)
(evidence of mental condition six years prior to will admitted); Veer v.
Hagemann, 334 11. 23, 165 N.E. 175 (1929) (opinions that testator was sane on
date shortly before will's execution admissible even though it was conceded
testator was of sound mind on that date); Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d
495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972) (summer prior to execution of will). Cf. Grantz v.

Grantz, 314 Ill. 243, 145 N.E. 398 (1924) (evidence as to mental capacity of
testator two and one-half years after execution inadmissible).

19. See, e.g., Milne v. McFadden, 38511. 11, 52 N.E.2d 146 (1943) (stroke);
Ergang v. Anderson, 378 11. 312, 38 N.E.2d 26 (1941)

senility).

(stroke causing
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20
was signed.
Beyond the foundation requirements, courts also restrict
opinion testimony as to the mental condition of a testator by
limiting the type or form of opinion that can be elicited. While a
nonexpert witness may testify that the testator was of sound or
unsound mind, he may not "invade the province of the jury" by
testifying as to his legal capacity to execute a will.2 1 Such opinions of ultimate fact interfere with the ability of the jury to reach
a verdict based upon the facts. To complicate matters, it is not
clear what constitutes the ultimate fact in a contest based upon
capacity. The elements of testamentary capacity are knowledge
of the nature and extent of one's property, knowledge of the natural objects of one's bounty, and an understanding of the nature

and effect of executing a will. 22 Although courts have consist-

ently held that a witness may not testify that a testator did or
did not possess testamentary capacity,23 until recently, courts

were split as to the admissibility of opinions concerning the elements of capacity. 24 Recent cases, however, suggest that such

25
opinions are admissible.
Expert witnesses are often called by both proponents and
contestants to testify on the issue of the testator's mental capacity. Unlike nonexpert witnesses, they may base their opinions
upon either facts given in hypothetical questions 26 or facts

20. See, e.g., Eschmann v. Cawi, 357 Ill. 379, 383, 192 N.E. 226, 228 (1934)

(testator declared insane two years after execution of will); Todd v. Todd,
221 Ill. 410, 413, 77 N.E. 680, 681 (1906) (stroke after execution of will).
21. See, e.g., Simpson v. Anderson, 305 Ill. 172, 178-79, 137 N.E. 88, 91
(1922); Bailey v. Beall, 251 IlM. 577, 582, 96 N.E. 567, 569 (1911); Wetzel v.
Firebaugh, 251 Ill. 190, 195-96, 95 N.E. 1085, 1088 (1911); Schneider v. Manning, 121 IlM. 376, 386, 12 N.E. 267, 270 (1887).
While opinions about testamentary capacity are inadmissible, opinions
as to the soundness of the testator's mind are admissible. See, e.g., Coleman v. Marshall, 263 IlM. 330, 340, 104 N.E. 1042, 1045 (1914); Hurley v. Caldwell, 44 Ill. 448, 91 N.E. 654 (1910) (witness allowed to testify that testator
was incapable of transacting business of any kind); Craig v. Southard, 148
Ill. 37, 35 N.E. 361 (1893); Keithly v. Strafford, 126 Ill. 507 (1888). See also
Wallace v. Whitman, 201 11M.
59, 66 N.E. 311 (1903) (opinions that testator was
"truthful," "honest," and "wanted to do right" inadmissible as irrelevant).
22. W. JAMES, ILLNOIS PROBATE LAw AND PRACTICE § 812.1(1), at 395 n.14

(1st ed. 1951).
23. See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
24. Heideman v. Kelsey, 7 Ill. 2d 601, 131 N.E.2d 531 (1956) (admissible);
Powell v. Weld, 41011. 198, 101 N.E.2d 581 (1951) (admissible on cross-examination); Baddeley v. Watkins, 293 IM. 394, 127 N.E. 725 (1920) (inadmissible); Trustees of Voodry v. University of Illinois, 251 Ill. 48, 95 N.E. 1034
(1911); Baker v. Baker, 202 Ill. 595, 67 N.E. 410 (1903) (inadmissible).
25. See, e.g., Heideman v. Kelsey, 7 Ill. 2d 601, 131 N.E.2d 531 (1956); Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972).
26. Garrus v. Davis, 234 Ill. 326, 84 N.E. 924 (1908); Schneider v. Manning,
121 M. 376,12 N.E. 267 (1887). The attorney in a will contest must be familiar
with the rules which apply to the use of hypothetical questions. Hypotheti-
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within their personal knowledge, e.g., facts noted in a personal
examination of the testator.27 The rule that forbids nonexperts
from giving an opinion concerning an ultimate fact, however,
also applies to expert testimony. An expert witness may testify
as to the soundness of the testator's mind, but he may not testify
28
as to whether the testator possessed testamentary capacity.

In an attempt to prove or disprove sanity, both proponents
and contestants are often tempted to offer opinion testimony relating to the testator's ability to transact business. Because the
degree of competence required to transact business is higher
than that required to execute a valid will, some courts have refused to allow nonexpert witnesses to testify as to whether they
believe the testator was capable of transacting ordinary business. 29 Certainly, the proponent should not be precluded from
offering testimony which meets the higher standard. However,
having done so, the proponent may have "opened the door" for
the admission of contradictory testimony that the testator was
cal questions must include all relevant, undisputed facts properly admitted
into evidence, although they need not contain those disputed facts which
tend to prove the opponent's case. Opp v. Pryor, 294 M. 538, 128 N.E. 580
(1920); People v. Freeman, 78 I. App. 2d 242, 223 N.E.2d 444 (1966). On
cross-examination, the opposing attorney may recast the hypothetical questions after supplying the omitted facts. Opp v. Pryor, 294 ml. 538, 128 N.E. 580
(1920). A hypothetical question may not include facts not in evidence. See,
e.g., People v. Muniz, 31 Il. 2d 130, 198 N.E.2d 855 (1964); People v. Freeman,
78 Ill. App. 2d 242, 223 N.E.2d 444 (1966); Piacentini v. Bonneffi, 691l. App. 2d
433,217 N.E.2d 507 (1966). But see Oudshoorn v. Warsaw Trucking Co., 38 Ill.
App. 3d 920, 349 N.E.2d 648 (1976) (court implied that hypothetical question
may include facts not in evidence where attorney represents evidence will
later be introduced). Nor may the question include facts not relevant to
issues at trial. Wright v. Upson, 303 Ill. 120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922) (hypothetical
question cannot include incidents which occurred at a time there is no
claim testator was of unsound mind). Finally, hypothetical questions must
specify which facts are to be assumed. Pyle v. Pyle, 158 111. 289, 41 N.E. 999
(1895) (experts not permitted to form opinions based upon all the evi-

dence). But see Schneider v. Manning, 121 Ill. 376, 12 N.E. 267 (1887) (expert

may form opinion based upon one side's evidence).
27. Norton v. Clark, 253 111. 557, 97 N.E. 1079 (1912) (physician testified
based upon personal examination of testator).
28. Garrus v. Davis, 234 111. 326, 84 N.E. 924 (1908).
29. See, e.g., DeMarco v. McGill, 402 111. 46, 55-56, 83 N.E.2d 313, 319 (1948)
(contestant's evidence admissible); Speirer v. Curtis, 312 Ill. 152, 160, 143
N.E. 427, 430 (1924) (proponent's evidence admissible); Bundy v. West, 297
Ill. 238, 242, 130 N.E. 709, 711 (1921) (proponent's evidence inadmissible);
Dowdey v. Palmer, 287 Ill. 42, 49-50, 122 N.E. 102, 105 (1919) (contestant's
evidence inadmissible); Coleman v. Marshall, 263 Ill. 330, 340, 104 N.E. 1042,
1045 (1914) (contestant's evidence admissible); Trubey v. Richardson, 224
III. 136, 145, 79 N.E. 592, 595 (1906) (contestant's evidence admissible);
Keithley v. Stafford, 126 Ill. 507, 522-23, 18 N.E. 740, 745-46 (1888) (contestant's evidence admissible).
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incapable of transacting business. 30
Undue Influence
No opinion testimony is admissible on the issue of undue
influence. Nonexpert witnesses are not competent to testify as
to whether they believe undue influence was exercised over the
testator. Moreover, they may not testify to their belief that the
decedent was easily influenced or susceptible to influence. 31
The jury must decide that issue from the factual allegations and
the evidence offered. While there are no Illinois cases dealing
with expert opinions on the issue of undue influence, it is unlikely that a court would permit an expert to testify that the testator was under or susceptible to undue influence when
executing the will.
THE ILLINOIS DEAD MAN's ACT

It is difficult to imagine a will contest in which the Dead
Man's Act does not play a crucial role. 32 In general, the Act pro30. Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill. 406, 409-10, 117 N.E. 602, 603 (1917); Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 502, 288 N.E.2d 82, 87 (1972) (citing 3 W.
JAMES, ILLMOIS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 92.4 (1st ed. 1951)).
31. Buerger v. Buerger, 317 111. 401, 417, 148 N.E. 274, 280-81 (1925); Teter
v. Spooner, 279 IlM. 39, 45, 116 N.E. 673, 676 (1917); O'Day v. Crabb, 269 1ll. 123,
129, 109 N.E. 724, 726 (1915); Adams v. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 251
Ill. 268, 272, 96 N.E. 253, 254 (1911) (subscribing witnesses' testimony that
fraud or undue influence was exercised held inadmissible); Larabee v.
Larabee, 240 Ill. 576, 581, 88 N.E. 1037, 1040 (1909); Compher v. Browning, 219
Ill. 429, 445, 76 N.E. 678, 684 (1906). But see Brownlie v. Brownlie, 357 III. 117,
123, 191 N.E. 268, 271 (1934) (subscribing witnesses allowed to testify that to
their knowledge no undue influence used).
32. The Dead Man's Act provides that:
[i]n the trial of any action in which any party sues or defends as the

representative of a deceased... no adverse party or person directly interested in the action shall be allowed to testify on his or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased or.. .to any event which
took place in the presence of the deceased... except in the following

instances:
(a)

If any person testifies on behalf of the representative to any

conversation with the deceased... or to any event which took place in
the presence of the deceased... any adverse party or interested person,
if otherwise competent, may testify concerning the same conversation
or event.
(b) If the deposition of the deceased.. .is admitted in evidence
on behalf of the representative, any adverse party or interested person,
if otherwise competent, may testify concerning the same matters admitted in evidence.
(c) Any testimony competent under Section 8-401 [Account
Books and Records] of this Act, is not barred by this Section.
(d) No person shall be barred from testifying as to any fact relating to the heirship of a decedent.
As used in this section:
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vides that any person interested in the outcome of the litigation
is incompetent to testify on his own behalf concerning any conversation or event which took place with or in the presence of
the testator. Because those most likely to have relevant information as to the testator's mental condition and relationships
are usually the testator's closest relatives, and the parties to the
contest, the Dead Man's Act often excludes much of the best evidence. 33 The justification usually given for this sweeping exclusionary rule is that the opposing party cannot call on the
testator to make a rebuttal.34
The Dead Man's Act prevents an interestedperson from testifying on his own behalf concerning any conversation or event
that took place in the presence of the testator if an adverse party
in the contest is a representative of the testator.35 Although
(b) "Representative" means an executor, administrator, heir or
legatee of a deceased person and any guardian or trustee of any such
heir or legatee....
(c) "Person directly interested in the action" or "interested person" does not include a person who is interested solely as executor,
trustee or in any other fiduciary capacity, whether or not he or she receives or expects to receive compensation for acting in that
capacity....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-201 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
33. In cases where the testator may have been seen only by family
members during the period near the will execution, application of the Act
will force the parties to substitute remote or indirect evidence for available,
but excludable, testimony. The bar can be so complete as to limit a witness's testimony to his name, address, and marital status. See LewandowApp. 3d 26, 335 N.E.2d 572 (1975).
ski v. Bakey, 32 Ill.
34. The rationale for the Act is found in VanMeter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill.
620, 622, 148 N.E. 392 (1925):
The purpose of the exception in favor of one suing as administrator in
statutes removing the incompetency of parties as witnesses is to guard
against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and to put the two
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of
The principal reason for the statutory exception
giving testimony ....
is the supposed inability of the representative to oppose the statements
of the adversary....
Id. at 623, 148 N.E. at 392. See also Schuppenhauer v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 30 Ill. App. 3d 607, 612, 332 N.E.2d 583, 588 (1975):
When one interested party is incapable of testifying, the danger of undetected perjury by the other party is increased. Furthermore, the influence of a personal interest is likely to alter a party's perception of
events regardless of his intent. Since self-serving statements are difficult to evaluate even with the benefit of cross-examination, they should
not be admitted unless they can be balanced by the equally self-serving
testimony of the opposite party.

Id.
35. Each of the italicized phrases appear in the language of the Dead
Man's Act. See szupra note 32. Their interpretations are discussed below.
See infra text accompanying notes 36-51.
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each of the italicized phrases is a term of art under the Act, the
key to appreciating the scope of the rule in will contests is the
definition of "representative," which includes not only the personal representative, as that term is normally used, 36 but any
"heir, legatee or devisee of a deceased person. '37 Because contestants usually come within the sweep of this definition, testimony of the proponents, as well as that of the contestants, is
38
subject to the prohibition.
"Interested person" includes all parties to the litigation and
all persons with an interest in the outcome, but is defined to exclude persons who merely receive fiduciary appointments under
the will. 39 In addition, cases have held that neither the attorney
who wrote the will4 nor any person without a direct monetary
interest in the outcome of the litigation 41 is an interested person. While the spouse of an interested person is also deemed to
be an interested person, the child of an interested person is not
so considered merely by virtue of the parents' status.4
36. The designation "personal representative" is usually reserved for a
person who stands in the place of another for legal purposes, such as an
executor, administrator, conservator, guardian, or bankruptcy trustee.
37. IL. ANN.STAT. ch. 110, § 8-201(d)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
38. A proponent in a will contest will always be a "representative"
under the Act, since he must be "an executor, administrator, heir or legatee" in order to qualify as a proponent. A contestant will be a "representative" unless he is neither an heir nor a beneficiary under the will, but seeks
to benefit under a prior will.
39. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-201(d)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
See also supra note 32.
40. See In re Estate of Fordyce, 130 11. App. 2d 755, 756-57, 265 N.E.2d 886,
887 (1971). In Michalski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 50 IlM. App. 3d 335, 365
N.E.2d 654 (1977), the court specifically held that the possibility that the will
scrivener might be sued for malpractice if the will was contested successfully did not make him a "person directly interested in the action." Id. at
339, 365 N.E.2d at 657. See also In re Estate of Wolfner, 27 M11.
2d 221, 224, 188
N.E.2d 712, 714 (1963) (performance of legal services does not render attorney incompetent as witness); Britt v. Darnell, 315 Ill.
385, 392-93, 146 N.E. 510,
513-14 (1925) (attorney who represented testator not incompetent witness);
Truman v. Gentz, 32 Ill.
App. 3d 886, 889, 336 N.E.2d 766, 768 (1975) (drawing
deed for decedent does not render attorney incompetent as witness).
41. See, e.g., Bellman v. Epstein, 279 Ill. 34, 36-37, 116 N.E. 707, 708 (1917)
(witness would neither gain nor lose from suit); Stephens v. Hoffman, 263
Ill. 197, 202-03, 104 N.E. 1090, 1092 (1914) (witness divested property interest
prior to trial, therefore witness was competent).
42. Peters v. Peters, 376 M11.
237, 243, 33 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1941) (wife);
Boyd v. Boyd, 163 Ill.
611, 614, 45 N.E. 118, 118-19 (1896) (children); Crane v.
Crane, 81 Ill. 165, 170-71 (1876) (husband); In re Estate of Franke, 124 Ill.
App. 2d 24, 31, 259 N.E.2d 841, 844 (1970) (wife). The reason for the distinction between spouses and children seems to be that the interest of a child in
his parents' property is more speculative than is the interest of a spouse in
the other spouse's property. See Boyd v. Boyd, 163 Ill. 611, 614, 45 N.E. 118,
118-19 (1896). The justification for this distinction is uncertain.
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Although the Dead Man's Act sweeps broadly, its benefits
are easily waived. If a party introduces evidence as to a conversation or event which took place in the presence of the testator,
that party cannot invoke the Act to prevent the opponent from
giving his own version of the same occurrence. 43 The meaning
of "conversation or event" is pivotal to the scope of the waiver
rule: the narrower its meaning, the narrower the scope of the
waiver. Unfortunately, no court has construed the phrase because it has been part of the Act only since 1973. 44 Prior to the
1973 amendment, the operative language, "conversation or
transaction," was construed rather broadly. In Van Meter v.
Goldfarb,45 the Illinois Supreme Court defined "transaction" as
a "combination of acts and events."' ' In that case, the "transaction" included all of the events comprising an automobile accident. An appellate court adopted a similarly broad construction
of "transaction" in Bain v. Schnorr.47 There, the executor
brought suit to collect money from an employee of the decedent.
The executor based his claim on the contention that the employee lacked authority to cash checks on the decedent's behalf.
After the executor introduced evidence to this effect, the court
allowed the defendant to introduce his own "Dead Man's Act"
evidence to show not only the presence of authority, but also the
proper use of the funds obtained. 48
43. It has been stated that "the purpose of the exceptions in the Dead
Man's Act permitting testimony as to the 'same conversation or transaction'

was to allow both parties to be 'on equal ground. Otherwise there would be
no one to confront the representative of a deceased person.'" Bain v.
Schnorr, 35 Ill.
App. 3d 761, 764, 342 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1976) (quoting Firke v.

McClure, 389 Ill.
543, 551, 60 N.E.2d 220, 223 (1945)). It should be noted, however, that the making or answering of discovery requests does not constitute introduction of evidence and, therefore, does not result in a waiver.
See, e.g., Premack v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2 Ill.
App. 3d 127, 130-31, 276
N.E.2d 77, 79 (1971) (propounding of interrogatory does not waive Dead

Man's Act); Pink v. Dempsey, 350 Ill.
App. 405, 409-10, 113 N.E.2d 334, 336
(1953) (taking discovery deposition does not waive the Dead Man's Act pro-

hibition). In addition, there is no waiver where the person testifying is not
an occurrence witness. See, e.g., Garrus v. Davis, 234 Ill.
326, 84 N.E. 924
(1908) (witness called only to prove genuineness of documents); DeYoung
v. Ralley, 329 Mll.
App. 1, 67 N.E.2d 221 (1946) (witness called under § 60 regarding prior admission).
44. This amendment to the Dead Man's Act became effective October 1,
1973. See ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).

45. 317 Ill.
620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925).
46. Id. at 624, 148 N.E. at 392 (quoting Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. 536,
139 P. 454 (1914).

47. 35 Ill.
App. 3d 761, 342 N.E.2d 439 (1976) (decided under pre-1973
language).
48. Id. In addition to VanMeter and Bain see Newman v. Youngblood,
394 111. 617, 627, 69 N.E.2d 309, 314 (1946) ("transaction" should be expanded
where closely related aspects of an occurrence are "inextricably intermingled"); Clifford v. Schaefer, 105 Ill.
App. 2d 233, 241, 245 N.E.2d 49, 54 (1969)
("entire conversation or transaction").
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One commentator hLs suggested that because the common
meaning of the word "event" is narrower than that of the word
"transaction," 49 the 1973 amendment narrowed the waiver provision. Despite the linguistic appeal of this argument, recent
changes in the rules of evidence have rarely resulted in less evidence being admissible. 50 It seems unlikely, therefore, that the
Illinois legislature intended this result. "Conversation or event"
should be flexibly applied to each case in such a way that each
side has a fair opportunity for rebuttal when the opponent, directly or indirectly, introduces evidence regarding a witness' impression of an event or chain of events.
An important and interesting illustration of the possibility
of unfair application of the Dead Man's Act is provided when
one party calls an adverse party to testify pursuant to section 21102 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 5 1 Clearly, either
side in a will contest is free to examine any adverse party under
section 2-1102 despite the Dead Man's Act, since the party being
examined need not testify in his own behalf.5

2

It is important to

note, however, that the examining party cannot force the witness to waive the Dead Man's Act by making such an examina49. Note, Illinois Dead Man's Act, 1973 ILL. L. F. 700, 711. There are no

decisions interpreting "event." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, however, defines "event" and "transaction" as follows:
Event:

(1):

something that happens:

OCCURRENCE

...

(2): course of events: ACTIVITY, EXPERIENCE ....
Transaction: Act of transacting or conducting any business; negotiation; management; proceeding; that which is done; an affair. It may
involve selling, leasing, borrowing, mortgaging or lending. Something
which has taken place, whereby a cause of action has arisen. It must
therefore consist of an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements
having some connection with each other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between themselves are altered. It is a broader term than "contract".
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1968).
50. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 326-327 (2d
ed. 1972) (discussing contemporary trend toward wider admission of evidence, particularly with regard to hearsay).
51. Upon the trial of any case any party thereto or any person for
whose immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, or the
officers, directors, managing agents or foreman of any party to the action, may be called and examined as if under cross-examination at the
instance of any adverse party. The party calling for the examination is
not concluded thereby but may rebut the testimony thus given by
countertestimony and may impeach the witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (formerly codified
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1972)).
52. See Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill.
2d 69, 75, 187 N.E.2d 734, 737 (1963);
Perkins v. Brown, 400 Ill.
490, 497, 81 N.E.2d 207, 210-11 (1948); Lathan v.
Rihel, 384 Ill. 478, 482-83, 51 N.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1943); Duffy v. Duffy, 243 Ill.
476, 481, 90 N.E. 697, 699 (1909); Clifford v. Schaefer, 105 Ill.
App. 2d 233, 240,
245 N.E.2d 49, 54 (1969).
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tion. 53 In addition, the examining party waives the right to
assert the Act against the opposing party as 54to the conversations
and events related by the adverse witness.
The fairness of this waiver depends upon its scope. For purposes of illustration, assume that only one of the parties had significant contact with the testator during a critical period, such as
the two months preceding execution of the will. That party
could be called by the opposing party under section 2-1102 and
be compelled to testify to a few selected incidents during the
period which, when isolated, create the impression of competence or incompetence. If a narrow construction of "conversation or event" is adopted, the witness could not then testify in
his own behalf as to other important events during this period
which tend to rebut the inference. Not only would this give the
jury a one-sided version of the facts, but it would result in a
party's knowledge being detrimental to his own case. In such a
situation, fairness requires that the waiver be construed broadly
enough to allow the witness (or other witnesses) to complete
the picture.
INCONSISTENT DECLARATIONS OF THE TESTATOR

Much of the jury appeal of a contestant's case may rest upon
declarations of the testator indicating an intention to leave property to the contestants or not to leave property to the will beneficiaries. Evidence of such declarations is not admissible to show
the testator's dispositive intent.55 This evidence may be admis53. "A person who is disqualified from testifying by [the Dead Man's

Act] cannot overcome his disqualification by calling an adverse party or the
party's agent under [§ 2-1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure] and using this
involuntary testimony to open the door for his own testimony." In re Estate

App. 3d 247, 249-50, 292 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1972). See also Garof Colewell, 9 Ill.
rus v. Davis, 234 Ill. 326, 331, 84 N.E. 924, 926 (1908) (witness made competent
as to issues raised by examination of adverse party); Loeb v. Stein, 198 Inl.
371, 381, 64 N.E. 1043, 1047 (1902) (same).
54. See Perkins v. Brown, 400 IM.490, 81 N.E.2d 207 (1948). The waiver
applies only to the "conversation or event" covered by the § 2-1102

examination:
We do not, however, understand and construe the statute to have been

intended to mean that if in such case the witness is called by the adverse party to testify as to one thing or upon one matter the disqualification against his testifying of his own motion and in his own behalf is
waived or removed and that he is thereby rendered competent to testify
upon all the issues involved in the case.
Id. at 496, 81 N.E.2d at 211. See also Garrus v. Davis, 234 Ill. 326, 331, 84 N.E.

App. 2d 233, 241, 245 N.E.2d 49, 54
924, 926 (1908); Clifford v. Schaefer, 105 Ill.
App. 432, 439, 13 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (1938).
(1969); Blumb v. Getz, 294 Ill.
353, 84 N.E.2d 355 (1949); Pollock v. Pollock,
55. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 Ill.
394, 127 N.E. 725
328 Ill. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); Baddeley v. Watkins, 293 Ill.
(1920); McCune v. Reynolds, 288 IlM. 188, 123 N.E. 317 (1919); O'Day v. Crabb,
615, 98 N.E. 996
123, 109 N.E. 724 (1915); Martin v. Beatty, 254 Il.
269 Ill.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:499

sible, however, for other purposes. For instance, a court may admit the declaration if the contestants are claiming lack of
concapacity and the declaration bears on the testator's5 mental
6
dition at the time the contested will was executed.
The scope of the rule encompasses both written and oral
declarations, 57 whether made before or after the date of the execution of the contested will,5 8 but does not include declarations
tending to support the will.5 9 Thus, courts have consistently admitted evidence of declarations tending to support the scheme
of disposition in the will 60 or tending to show the testator's capacity 6 l or absence of the exercise of undue influence. 62 Although variously stated, the rule's purpose is to protect the
validity of wills and to preserve the right of individuals to
change their testamentary documents. Illinois courts have obviously felt that evidence of a "change of heart" has an unusually
strong emotional appeal to juries, without necessarily indicating
lack of testamentary capacity or the exercise of undue
(1912); Floto v. Floto, 233 IM.605, 84 N.E. 712 (1908); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill.
26, 78 N.E. 1 (1906); Compher v. Browning, 219 Ill. 429, 76 N.E. 678 (1906).
56. Norton v. Clark, 253 Ill. 557, 97 N.E. 1079 (1912); Wilkinson v. Service,
249 Ill. 146, 94 N.E. 50 (1911); Hurley v. Caldwell, 244 111. 448, 91 N.E. 654
(1910); Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill. 134 (1878) (statements by testator concerning annoyances to which spouse subjected him were improperly
excluded).
57. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 Ill. 353, 84 N.E.2d 355 (1949) (oral declaration);
Pollock v. Pollock, 328 IlM.179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927) (written statement); Baddeley v. Watkins, 293 Ill. 394, 127 N.E. 725 (1920) (written statement); O'Day
v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, 109 N.E. 724 (1915) (written statement); Martin v.
Beatty, 254 Ill. 615, 98 N.E. 996 (1912) (oral declaration); Snell v. Welden, 239
Ill. 279, 87 N.E. 1022 (1909) (written statement); Floto v. Floto, 233 fI. 605, 84
N.E. 712 (1908) (written statement); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 78 N.E. 1
(1906) (oral declaration); Compher v. Browning, 219 Ill. 429, 76 N.E. 678
(1906) (oral declaration).
58. Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 35, 78 N.E. 1, 4 (1906) ("[P]arties, making wills, cannot invalidate them by their own parol declarations, made previously or subsequently.") (emphasis added).
59. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 Ill. 353, 358, 84 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1949) ("declara-

tions made by a testator in conformity with the provisions of a will are admissible as tending to show lack of undue influence. . ."); O'Day v. Crabb,
269 Ill. 123, 130, 109 N.E. 724, 727 (1915); Waters v. Waters, 222 111. 26, 35-36, 78

N.E. 1, 4 (1906); Compher v. Browning, 219 Ill. 429, 441, 76 N.E. 678, 683 (1906).
60. O'Day v. Crabb, 269 IlM.123, 130, 109 N.E. 724, 727 (1915) ("It is proper
to show the contents of a former will on behalf of the proponents... in order to show that the testator had a constant and enduring scheme for the
distribution of his property..
").
61. Id. at 130, 109 N.E. at 727 (held that former will would be admissible
to "refute the charge of lack of testamentary capacity."). See also Pollock v.
Pollock, 328 Ill. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927).
62. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 mll. 353, 84 N.E.2d 355 (1949); Pollock v. Pollock,
328 Ill. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); O'Day v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, 109 N.E. 724
(1915); Waters v. Waters, 222 11. 26, 78 N.E. 1 (1906); Compher v. Browning,
219 Ill. 429, 76 N.E. 678 (1906).
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influence.
The rule excludes two categories of potential evidence:
(1) evidence showing the testator's intention to leave property
in a manner different from that contained in his last will,6 and
65
(2) evidence showing disaffection toward will beneficiaries.
Application of the rule to the first category, exclusion of evidence of a dispositive intention inconsistent with the terms of
the will, is especially important because such declarations are
common 66 and, if their jury appeal is relied upon, they may mislead contestants as to the strength of their case. Of particular
interest is the application of the rule to exclude prior wills made
by the testator containing different dispositive schemes. 67 In
the case of contestants who are not heirs of the testator, but legatees under a prior will, exclusion of the earlier will may make it
impossible to demonstrate effectively to the jury why the contestants are challenging the will.
A testator's disparaging remarks about will beneficiaries, although potentially damaging to the proponents, are often excluded from evidence. 68 An example of this operation of the rule
is found in Snell v. Weldon,6 9 in which the court excluded the
testator's written comments, on the back of a letter sent to him
63. The mere fact, however, that a testator by a prior will had made a
disposition of his property different from that made by a later instru-

ment of itself would be of little or no value, for, if mentally competent to
make a will, he would have a right to change his mind so long as testamentary capacity continued.
Pollock v. Pollock, 328 Il. 179, 185-86, 159 N.E. 305, 309 (1927). See also O'Day
v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, 109 N.E. 724 (1915).
64. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 328 IlM. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); O'Day v.
Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, 109 N.E. 724 (1915); Martin v. Beatty, 254 Ill. 615, 98 N.E.
996 (1912); Floto v. Floto, 233 Ill. 605, 84 N.E. 712 (1908); Cheney v. Goldy, 225
26, 78 N.E. 1 (1906); Hill v.
394, 80 N.E. 289 (1907); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill.
Ill.
Bahrns, 158 IM.314, 41 N.E. 912 (1895).
65. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 Ill. 353, 84 N.E.2d 355 (1949); Miles v. Long, 342
Ill. 589, 600, 174 N.E. 836, 840 (1931); Snell v. Weldon, 239 Ill. 279, 87 N.E. 1022
(1909) (written evidence of illicit relationship between testator and will
beneficiary inadmissible).
66. See, e.g., Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 78 N.E. 1 (1906). The court
refused to admit testimony that the testatrix had stated that she wanted to
treat her family equally. Id. at 35, 78 N.E. at 4.
67. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 328 IlM. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); Baddeley
v. Watkins, 293 Ill. 394,127 N.E. 725 (1920); McCune v. Reynolds, 288 IM. 188,
123 N.E. 317 (1919); O'Day v. Crabb, 269 IlM. 123, 109 N.E. 724 (1915); Floto v.
Floto, 233 Ill. 605, 84 N.E. 712 (1908). In one aberrant case, Blackhurst v.
James, 304 Ill. 586, 136 N.E. 754 (1922), a prior inconsistent will and codicils
were admitted because they tended to show an ongoing conspiracy between proponents to cause the testator to distribute his property in a manner more favorable to their interests.
68. Mosher v. Thrush, 402 m. 353, 84 N.E.2d 355 (1949); Miles v. Long, 342
Ill.
589, 174 N.E. 836 (1931).
69. 239 Ill. 279, 87 N.E. 1022 (1909).
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by the will beneficiary, which disclosed an illicit relationship between the testator and the beneficiary. The court stated that
"moral delinquency" has nothing to do with capacity or undue
influence, and found that the jury's erroneous verdict invalidating the will was based upon this improperly admitted
70
"declaration."
The rule excluding inconsistent declarations of the testator
is subject to an important, but poorly defined, exception. Where
the contest is based, at least in part, on lack of testamentary capacity, declarations of the testator which tend to show the condition of his mind at the time of execution are admissible, whether
or not they are in conformity with the will. 71 However, a court
normally will not allow the admission of such declarations
under this exception unless there is independent proof of lack of
testamentary capacity. 72 Staking out the boundaries of this exception has proven to be a difficult task. In determining whether
to admit the declaration, the court must weigh the importance of
the jury's need to know of the declaration in order to determine
the testator's capacity against the declaration's prejudicial impact. Of critical importance is the proximity in time of the statement to the date of execution. 73 The closer in time the
declaration is to that date, the more valuable it is to the trier of
fact. On the other hand, the occurrence of any significant
changes in the testator's condition between the time of the declaration and the date of execution would reduce the value of the
statement in determining capacity.74 Finally, the substance of
the statement itself must be carefully considered to determine
whether the declaration should be admitted. For example, a
statement by the testator on the day the will is executed that he
intends to leave his money to his goldfish may have a great bearing on his capacity. A statement that he planned to leave his
property to X (when the will beneficiary is Y) has less probative
value as to capacity, but may have significant prejudicial value
to the contestants. Because of the subjective nature of these pa70. Id. at 295-96, 87 N.E. at 1027.
71. Norton v. Clark, 253 i1.557, 97 N.E. 1079 (1912); Wilkinson v. Service,
134 (1878).
249 IIl. 146, 94 N.E. 50 (1911); Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill.
448, 91 N.E. 654 (1910).
72. See, e.g., Hurley v. Caldwell, 244 IlM.
492, 46 N.E.2d 1011 (1943) (declarations
73. Knudson v. Knudson, 382 Ill.
of testator held inadmissible because not related to condition of testator at
91, 123 N.E. 306 (1919)
time will was executed); Abbott v. Church, 288 M11.
(letters written to contestant two and four years prior to will's execution
held inadmissible). See also Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 1l1. 480, 68 N.E. 56 (1903),
where the same rule was applied in a suit to set aside the execution of a
deed by an alleged incompetent.
74. For example, where contestants claim the testator became incapacitated following a stroke, declarations of the testator showing incapacity
made before the stroke should not be admissible.
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rameters, courts
75
exception.

have been

inconsistent

in applying the

PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE

Developing facts which prove the exercise of undue influence over the testator can be a very difficult task for contestants,
especially in light of the evidentiary pitfalls already discussed.
It is difficult to find an independent party ready to testify that
the individual accused of exercising undue influence stood menacingly over the testator as he drew up his will, directing him or
her as to its contents.7 6 Indeed, the legal standard for proving
undue influence 77 is so difficult to meet that the law has developed a presumption to aid contestants. Where it can be shown
that: (1) the proponent was in a fiduciary relationship with the
testator; (2) the proponent procured the execution of the new
will; and (3) the new will benefitted the proponent, a presumption arises that the new will was the product of the proponent's
undue influence. 78 Unfortunately, the requirements for and the
operation of the presumption are not as straightforward as they
appear.
Of th,, three elements underlying the presumption, the requirement of benefit to the proponent is the least problematical.
So long as the proponent receives substantially more money or
75. Courts have extended the exception to admit declarations by the
testator which are more relevant to the issue of the relationship between
the testator and heirs or will beneficiaries than upon the testator's capacity.
For example, in Wilkinson v. Service, 249 Ill.
146, 94 N.E. 50 (1911), the Illinois Supreme Court held that "[d]eclarations. . .that certain of the testator's children were wanting in natural affection... are properly considered
as showing his state of mind." Id. at 151, 94 N.E. at 53.
76. This appears to be a possible interpretation of the level and kind of
showing needed to prove "undue influence." See Sloger v. Sloger, 26 InI. 2d
366, 186 N.E.2d 288 (1962); Sterling v. Dubin, 6 111. 2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955).
77. The law is settled that to avoid a will upon the ground of undue
influence it must be directly connected with the execution of the will
itself. It must operate when the will is made, must be directed especially toward procuring the will in favor of particular persons and must
be of such a character as to destroy the testator's freedom of will, so as
to render his will obviously the result of the mind and brain of some
other person.
Mosher v. Thrush, 402 111. 353, 357-58, 84 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1949). See also Lake
v. Seiffert, 410 Ill.
444, 448, 102 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1951); Flanigon v. Smith, 337
Ill.
572, 577, 169 N.E. 767, 769 (1930); Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill.
App. 2d 88,
99, 234 N.E.2d 91, 96-97 (1968).
78. See, e.g., Breault v. Feigenholtz, 54 Ill.
2d 173, 182, 296 N.E.2d 3, 9
(1973); Lynn v. Lynn, 21 Ill.
2d 131, 135, 171 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1960); Redmond v.
Steele, 5 Ill.
2d 602, 610, 126 N.E.2d 619, 623 (1955); Tidholm v. Tidholm, 391
Ill.
19, 25, 62 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1945); Madden v. Keyser, 331 Ill. 643, 650, 163
N.E. 424, 427 (1928); Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88, 99, 234 N.E.2d
91, 97 (1968).
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property under the challenged will than he would otherwise
have received, the benefit test is satisfied. 79 Since the contestants would not contest the "last will" unless their financial position was adversely affected, one or more of the proponents is
certain to have been benefitted by the "last will."
The requirement that the proponent be in a fiduciary relationship with the testator is not as difficult to fulfill as it might
appear. The meaning of "fiduciary" for these purposes is very
broad and includes not only a variety of recognized fiduciary relationships,8 0 but also any significant degree of practical domination and dependence between the proponent and the
testator.8 '

The requirement that the will was "procured" by the proponent presents the greatest obstacle to use of the presumption.
In early cases, it was implied that any degree of participation in
the execution of the will would suffice, 82 but recent cases sug79. In spite of the apparent simplicity of this requirement, a recent case
has raised some question as to whether the benefit must be judged in relation to the defendant's intestate share. Beyers v. Billingsley, 54 Ill. App. 3d
427, 436-37, 369 N.E.2d 1320, 1327 (1977). See also Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill.
2d 160, 172, 115 N.E.2d 226, 232 (1953). Benefit does not appear to include
fiduciary appointments. Breault v. Feigenholtz, 54 Il1. 2d 173, 182, 296 N.E.2d
3, 10 (1973).
80. Typically, these would include guardian-ward, trustee-beneficiary,
agent-principal, attorney-client, and others. Wik v. Hagen, 410 Ill. 158, 163,
101 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1951); Apple v. Apple, 407 Ill. 464, 470, 95 N.E.2d 334, 337
(1950); Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88, 100, 234 N.E.2d 91, 97 (1968);
In re Estate of Brumshagan, 27 Ill. App. 2d 14, 22, 169 N.E.2d 112, 116 (1960).
81. In the following cases, an implied fiduciary relationship was found:
Wiik v. Hagen, 410 Ill. 158, 163, 101 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1951); Tidholm v.
Tidholm, 391 Ill. 19, 25, 62 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1945); Madden v. Keyser, 331 Ill.
643, 650, 163 N.E. 424, 427 (1928); Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88,
100-01, 234 N.E.2d 91, 98 (1968). Cf. Redmond v. Steele, 5 Ill. 2d 602, 610-11,
126 N.E.2d 619, 623-24 (1955); Kolze v. Fordtran, 412 Ill. 461, 468-69, 107 N.E.2d
686, 691 (1952) (care of testator during illness); Pepe v. Caputo, 408 Ill. 321,
326-27, 97 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1951) (parent and child). It should be noted that
implied fiduciary relationships must be established by clear and convincing
proof.
82. In the following cases, procurement was found: Lynn v. Lynn, 21 Ill.
2d 131, 135, 171 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1960) (defendant discussed terms of new will
with attorney); Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill. 2d 160, 172-73, 115 N.E.2d 226, 232
(1953) (helped secure attorney); Tidholm v. Tidholm, 391 Ill. 19, 25, 62 N.E.2d
473, 476 (1945) (wrote out terms of will); Dial v. Welker, 328 111. 56, 62, 159
N.E. 286, 289 (1927) (actually prepared will); Seavey v. Glass, 315 Ill. 611, 614,
146 N.E. 536, 537 (1925) (procured the attorney); Yess v. Yess, 255 Ill. 414,
419, 99 N.E. 687, 688 (1912) (present during drafting of will); Beyers v. Billingsley, 54 Ill. App. 3d 427, 437, 369 N.E.2d 1320, 1327-28 (1977) (initiated attorney contact, provided transportation to attorney, oversaw execution in
his home). Cf. Sloger v. Sloger, 26 Ill.
2d 366, 369, 186 N.E.2d 288, 289 (1962)
(drove testator to lawyer, but waited in outer office); Anthony v. Anthony,
20 Ill. 2d 584, 587, 170 N.E.2d 603, 604 (1960) (drove testator to attorney's office); Lake v. Seiffert, 410 Ill. 444, 449, 102 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1951) (present at

execution); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 361 Ill. 499, 510, 198 N.E. 432, 435 (1935)
(drove testator to attorney's office and discussed will); Flanigon v. Smith,
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gest that more direct participation is required.83 The Illinois
Supreme Court has apparently construed procurement to mean
a degree of participation in the drafting and execution of the will
which indicates that the proponent was in such a position that
one could reasonably expect that he or she influenced the terms
of the will. 84 In Sterling v. Dukin,85 the court held that transcribing the testator's will and making arrangements for its execution
did not constitute procurement sufficient to raise a presumption
of undue influence. In Sloger v. Sloger,86 the court held that
driving the testator to the lawyer's office to discuss and then execute the will did not amount to procurement. By comparison,
procurement was found in Swenson v. Wintercorn,8 7 where the
proponent suggested that the testator make a new will, called
his own attorney, and was present during the discussions with
88
the attorney and at the execution itself.
If the plaintiff has introduced some credible evidence as to
each of the three elements of the presumption, Illinois Pattern
Jury Instruction 200.03 and the comments thereto state that the
court should instruct the jury concerning the presumption. 89
The Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision in Diederich v.
Walters90 suggests, however, that the comments to the Illinois
Pattern Instructions may no longer reflect the law. Diederich involved a presumption that a child between the ages of seven and
fourteen could not be contributorily negligent. In holding that
the trial court correctly omitted an instruction to the jury on the
presumption in the face of evidence of the child's negligence,
the court purported to adopt the "bursting bubble" theory for all
rebuttable presumptions in Illinois. 9 1 If this theory is applied to
337 Ill. 572, 577-78, 169 N.E. 767, 769 (1930) (no evidence of undue influence);
Prinz v. Schmidt, 334 Ill. 576, 585, 166 N.E. 209, 212 (1929) (no evidence);

Blackhurst v. James, 293 Ill. 11, 29, 127 N.E. 226, 233 (1920) (no evidence concerning execution).
83. See, e.g., Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88, 234 N.E.2d 91
(1968).
84. Sloger v. Sloger, 26 Il1. 2d 366, 186 N.E.2d 288 (1962); Sterling v. Du-

bin, 6 Ill. 2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955).
85. 6 Ill. 2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955).

86. 26 Ill. 2d 366, 186 N.E.2d 288 (1962).

87. 92 Ill. App. 2d 88, 234 N.E.2d 91 (1968).
88. The presumption has not been applied in any case where it was not
shown, or could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence, that the defendant knew the terms of the challenged will at or prior to its execution.
89. IPI 200.03, comment, supra note 6. See also Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill.
198, 204, 101 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1951).
90. 65 Ill. 2d 95, 357 N.E.2d 1128 (1976). See also Franciscan Sisters
Health Care, Corp. v. Dean, 102 Ill. App. 3d 61, 429 N.E.2d 919 (1981).
91. Under this theory, once evidence is admitted which refutes the presumption, the presumption evaporates. 65 Ill. 2d at 102-03, 357 N.E.2d at
1131-33.
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the presumption of undue influence, instruction 200.03 should
not be given if the proponent has introduced any credible evidence that the will was not the product of undue influence, even
if the contestant has made some showing of all of the elements
92
of the presumption.
Commentators have defended broad use of the instruction
on the ground that the presumption of undue influence is more
than a rule of evidence. They assert that it is a substantive rule
of law reflecting a public policy that fiduciaries be held accountable for their conduct 93 These commentators contend that the
presumption should remain in a case regardless of the introduction of evidence rebutting the presence of undue influence. 94
The analysis fails to consider several important points. First,
the class of persons who are fiduciaries for purposes of the presumption is much broader than the class of fiduciaries to whom
the special obligations of this capacity ordinarily apply.95 It is
one thing to make a trustee, who received compensation and is
on notice of his special fiduciary status, subject to the highest
standards of conduct, but quite another to apply the same legal
standards to persons who are constructive fidiciaries only for
the limited purposes of creating a presumption. Second, instructing the jury as to the presumption shifts the burden of
proof from the contestant to the proponent. 96 This has the effect
97
of requiring the proponent to prove a lack of undue influence;
proving a negative is often an unreasonably difficult task. Third,
the absence of the instruction would not overly burden contestants because they could still build their case upon the logical
inferences that the jury (or judge) could make from the facts
underlying the presumption. Finally, retention of the presumption undermines the public policy of protecting the validity of
wills from disgruntled heirs, the policy which gave rise to all of
these complex evidentiary rules.
92. The proposition has been frequently expressed in contract cases.

IPI 200.03, comment, supra note 6. See also Miller v. Pettengill, 392 Ill.
117,
63 N.E.2d 735 (1945) (contract case).
93. IPI 200.03, comment, supra note 6.
94. Id.
95. The class of fiduciaries in the cases cited by the comment is narrower, and those fiduciaries are on notice of their duties, whereas persons
who may qualify as "fiduciaries" for the purposes of the presumption will
rarely be aware of their position. It is, therefore, unfair to impose automati-

cally the burdens of traditional fiduciaries upon them.
96. Seavey v. Glass, 315 Ill. 611, 146 N.E. 536 (1925), and Leonard v. Burtie, 226 11M.
422, 80 N.E. 992 (1907), held that this shift in the burden of proof
does not make IPI 200.03 objectionable. But see McElroy v. Force, 38 Ill. 2d
528, 232 N.E.2d 708 (1967).
97. See Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions:Order Out of Chaos, 58
B.U.L. REV. 527 (1978).
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RECOMMENDATIONS

In evaluating the strength of a contestant's case, the proponent's attorney should not rely on opinion testimony because a
significant part of it may not be admitted. This uncertainty can
be especially problematical because of the trial court's broad
discretion in ruling on opinion testimony. Proponents should
make an effort to eliminate testamentary capacity as an issue
prior to trial; disposing of this ground for setting the will aside
will severely curtail a contestant's ability to introduce opinion
testimony which could sway the jury on noncapacity issues.
Proponents should carefully consider the introduction of
testimony to the effect that the testator was able to conduct
business, since this is a higher level of competence than is required to execute a will. Once such evidence has been introduced, the contestants will be able to introduce potentially
damaging rebuttal testimony which would not otherwise be admissible. Moreover, a long colloquy regarding the testator's ability to conduct business may lead the jury to believe that the
ability to conduct business is the standard by which to judge
competence. Where the contestants are relying upon showing
the exercise of undue influence in the execution of the will,
opinion testimony will normally be of no assistance. This is one
of the reasons why proving undue influence is more difficult
than most contestants imagine.
The importance and complexity of the Dead Man's Act cannot be overemphasized. As previously suggested, the rationale
for the Dead Man's Act is that testimony concerning events that
took place in the presence of the testator cannot be contradicted
by the opposing parties since the testator is no longer alive to
give his version. As applied, however, the rule excludes all such
testimony even though an opposing party or disinterested person is present to verify or rebut the witness's testimony. As long
as the legislature does not see fit to amend the Dead Man's Act,
the courts must adjust the scope of the waiver rule to achieve
the fairest possible result. Each side should prepare to try its
case assuming that it will not be able to offer evidence precluded
by the Act. Careful consideration must also be given to whether
each bit of evidence to be offered may waive that party's ability
to assert the Dead Man's Act. In some circumstances, it may be
advantageous for counsel not to object to prohibited testimony if
admission of the evidence offered would create a valuable
waiver. To aid trial preparation and to avoid lengthy arguments
on objections during trial, the parties and the court should
agree, before trial begins, on general ground rules for application of the Dead Man's Act. This could be accomplished either
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informally, e.g., at a pretrial conference, or formally, by use of a
motion in limine.
To enhance the likelihood of getting a testator's inconsistent
declarations before the jury, contestants should include a count
to the effect that the testator lacked the capacity to make a will,
even though the contest may rest primarily upon the exercise of
undue influence or some other ground. Conversely, proponents
should make every effort to have the capacity count stricken on
a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment to prevent application of the exception to the exclusionary rule. In ruling on
such motions, the court ought to give careful consideration to
the evidentiary effect of granting or denying such a motion on
the case as a whole.
A contestant who relies on the presumption of undue influence should introduce as much evidence of the three elements
as is possible to avoid a directed verdict and to support use of
the presumption in the face of contrary evidence. In some
cases, the proponent may be a fiduciary by both a personal relationship with the testator and a contractual relationship, e.g.,
under a power of attorney. In such circumstances the contestant should emphasize the contractual relationship in order to
enhance the "public duty of fiduciaries" rationale which underlies the presumption and to ensure its availability. As with
other aspects of will contest litigation, the interplay between capacity and undue influence can be important. Where showing a
fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the testator is
difficult, a strong showing of the testator's feebleness will support evidence of fiduciary relation through implied domination.
Because of the potentially damaging effect of the presumption to the validity of the will, the proponent should make every
effort to prevent its application. This can be done by showing
that, as a matter of law, one or more of the three elements do not
exist. Ideally, the proponent should dispose of the capacity issue early in the case. Since this will limit evidence which the
contestants can introduce concerning the testator's condition, it
may increase the burden on contestants to show the proponent's fiduciary status.
Procurement is the weakest link in most contestant's cases;
the proponent's presence or absence at discussions concerning
the will or at its execution is crucially important. No Ilinois
case has yet applied the presumption if the contestant failed to
show that the proponent knew or had an opportunity to know
the contents of the will prior to its execution. Although the benefit requirement is often straightforward, it has been suggested
that a benefit exists only where the defendant received a dispro-
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portionate amount compared to other similarly situated objects
of the testator's bounty. 98 It would seem, however, that the
proper test should be whether the proponent receives more
under the contested will than under the prior will or, if no such
will exists, as an heir-at-law.
CONCLUSION

Judges have historically distrusted the ability of juries to
determine the validity of wills; juries are seen as quick to replace the dispositive decision of the testator with their own and,
in so doing, fail to accord the existing will its full presumption of
validity. As this article has illustrated, courts have used a variety of mechanisms, including the development of new evidenceexclusion rules and the expansion of existing rules, to shield juries from inflammatory evidence. In one respect, limitations on
admissibility have become so severe that a presumption has developed so that contestants have at least a chance of proving undue influence. Whatever the merits of these special evidentiary
rules, their operation and interaction create enormous complexity in a will contest. This complexity not only increases the cost
of will contests, but also tends to confuse the court and the parties as to the strength of a claim, making settlement more difficult. In addition, the confusion makes victory in weak contests
appear attainable, thereby wasting time and the assets of estates on marginal claims.
Two solutions to this growing level of complexity are possible: eliminate the restrictive evidentiary rules, or eliminate juries in will contests. If the rules are not applied, it is presumed
that more will contests will be brought and more wills held invalid. If this occurs, the disposition of property at death will become less certain, and testators will use devices other than wills
to dispose of their property in order to avoid a will contest.
These other devices include inter vivos transfers to intended
beneficiaries, secretion of property to avoid probate, and the use
of trusts and in terrorem clauses, which may foster even further
litigation. It is the authors' view that such fundamental changes
in the testamentary transfer of property are not supported by
policy or responsible popular opinion.
One alternative is to have will contests tried to the court.
The right to jury trials in will contests was created by statute,99
and is mandated by neither the United States Constitution nor
98. Beyers v. Billingsley, 54 Ill. App. 3d 527, 369 N.E.2d 1320 (1977).
99. 111. ANN. STAT. ch. 110%, § 8-1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (formerly
codified at IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 92 (Smith-Hurd 1975)). This provision
was derived from § 7 of the Wills Act of 1872. The statutory right to contest
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the Illinois Constitution. Aside from saving expenses for the estate, bench trials would allow prompt resolution of claims. The
detriment to the parties, if any, would be slight because a large
percentage of jury verdicts in will contests are overturned,
either by the trial judge or on appeal. Unlike many other kinds
of litigation, will contests rarely involve compensation to an injured party. Instead, the issue is who among the parties is entitled to a windfall. Surely the state's resources ought not be
used, except to the extent necessary, to settle such disputes.

a will derives from laws of the territory which became Illinois in the Act of
February 10, 1821, at p. 119.

